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say: "W e enact tis in the United States because you have
enacted the same in your territory." In the foreign case there is
no accord between the rules--they do not apply to the same place
nor to the same (although to a like) subject-matter.
In the domestic case there is not only accord between the rules,
but they are the very same in terms-operate in the same place,
over the same subject-matter, and the donor and the donee of the
cower are at one. But there is no donor in the other case. The
attitude of Congress is anything but that of donor ; it is that of
an adversary. It makes the regulations, that it may be a donee.
in the one case the legislature gives away its legislative power; in
the other it makes the utmost exertion of the power possible. Ii
operates extra-territorially and beyond its jurisdiction, by a vigor
ous, hostile and unsparing exercise of its power within its juris
diction against all subjects of the foreign power, whose will the
advocates of local option would have us believe we thereby propose to gratify to the same extent and with the like subserviency
that a legislature does, which declares its laws shall take effect
only when the people choose to consider them binding.
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A railroad corporation cannot lawfully take, hold and deal in real estate for
other purposes and to a greater extent than it is authorized so to do by its charter,
but the amount of lands which such corporation can legally hold, can only be determined by a direct proceeding against the same by the state for a violation of its
charter.
While a contract to convey to such corporation land which is not to be used for
the purpose for which it is authorized by its charter to hold real estate cannot be
specifically enforced in a court of equity, yet a deed made to such corporation, and
oy the corporation to a third party, operates to convey all the title of the original

grantor.

THE opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-This was an action of ejectment. Both parties
claimed under one James C. McKeehan, who was the patentee
under the United States for the land on which the lot in controversy was situated.
The defendants claim title through the Pacific Railroad Company, or rather through Frederick S. Bellon, trustee for the sole
ADAMS,
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use and benefit of the Pacific Railroad Company. The ieed to
Bellon embraced one hundred and fifty-one town lots, distributed
alternately throughout the town of Knob Noster, situated on the
line of said railroad, ahd five and a half acres of depot grounds,
and was executed to the said trustee in 1858, for the use of said
company, for and in consideration of the sum of one dollar and
the benefits which the grantor expected to obtain from the location of a passenger and freight station upon the land thereby conveyed; and the deed also authorized a sale by the trustee of all
such portions of the real estate thereby conveyed, as should not
be required for the purposes of said road, at such time and in
such manner as the board of directors of said company should
deem most conducive to the interest of said company.
The defendants claimed title under and through this conveyance
to Bellon, and have the oldest paper title, provided the deed to
Bellon as trustee is valid.
Numerous instructions were given and refused, raising the
question as to the power of the Pacific Railroad Company to take,
hold and dispose of the lands in question; and the Circuit Court
naving decided these questions in favor of the defendants, the
plaintiff has brought the case here by appeal.
The question as to the power of the Pacific Railroad Company
to receive grants of land, and to dispose of them, depends upon
the proper construction of its charter and the laws of this state
referring thereto.
By the first section of the charter, among other things, it is
provided that it "1may hold, use, possess and enjoy the fee simple
or other title in and to any real estate, and may sell and dispose of
the same." (See Laws of Missouri, 1849, p. 219.)
The seventh section of this act was amended in 1851 (see Laws of
1851, § 9, p. 272), when it was provided that "1said company shall
have power to locate and construct a railroad, &c., and for that
purpose may hold a strip of land not exceeding one hundred feet
wide, except where it may be necessary for turn-outs, embankments or excavations, in which case they may hold a sufficient
width for the preservation of their road, and may *alsohold sufficient land for the erection and maintenance of depots, landingplaces or wharves, engine-houses, machine-shops, warehouses and
wood and water stations."
Section twenty of the Act of 1849, above referred to, provides
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that "the operations of said company shall be confined to the
general business of locating, constructing, managing and using
said railroad, and the acts necessary or proper to carry the same
into complete and successful operation."
By section fifty-seven of an act entitled "An Act to authorize
the formation of railroad associations, and to regulate the same,"
approved December 13, 1855, it is provided that " all existing
railroad corporations within this state, and such as now or may
be hereafter chartered, shall respectively have and possess all the
powers and privileges contained in this act, and they shall be
subject to all the duties, liabilities and provisions not inconsistent
with the provisions of their charter contained in this act."
Among the privileges referred to in this section are those con.
tained in section 29 of .the same act (see First Revised Laws,
1855, p. 425), which provides that such company may "take and
hold such voluntary grants of real estate and other property as
may be made to it to aid in the construction, maintenance and
accommodation of its railroad, but the real estate received by
voluntary grant shall be held and used for the purpose of such
grant only."
It may also "purchase, hold and use all such real estate and
other property as may be necessary for the construction and
maintenance of its railroad and the stations and other accommo-dations necessary to accomplish the object of its incorporation."
From these enactments it is evident to my mind that it was the
intention of the legislature to invest the Pacific Railroad Company with power to take two classes of real estate; one class it
had the right to receive and dispose of at pleasure, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of its road, or for raising funds
to pay debts contracted in its construction, &c. ; the other class
it can only hold for depots, road-beds, &c.
The history of the country shows that this is the proper construction of the acts referred to. From the time the charter was
granted, donations of real estate to aid in its construction have
been made all along the line of the road, and titles have been
acquired and investments made on the faith of this being the
proper construction of the charter. It is true that this company,
like all other corporations, is subject to all the limitations expressed in the charter, but the charter and the laws above referred
VOL. XXL-1O
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o expressly authorize grants of land to be made to aid in t
construction of the road.
The state considered this railroad company able to receive t e
lands donated by Congress without any! enlargement of its cha.ter, and accordingly made the grant to aid in construction of the
main trunk line to the bifurcation of the south-west branch, and
from that point to apply the lands to the south-west branch.
Although this railroad company may receive grants of land,
and sell and dispose of the same for the purposes of its construction and payment of its debts, &c., it cannot become a larger
landed proprietor for purposes not connected with its creation.
But the amount of lands it may receive cannot be decided between these parties; conceding the power to receive lands for the
purposes aforesaid, no one, except the state, can raise the question as to the amount that may be received. This was decided by
this court in the case of Chambers v. The City of St. Louis, 29
Mo. Rep. 576-7; also by the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of Aeyer v. Croft, reported in 11 American Law Register 308; see also, to the same effect, Smith v. Sheely, decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States at the December Term
1871.
Judge SCOT, in Chambers v. City of a. Louis, says, delivering
the opinion of the court, "There being a right in the city to take
and hold lands, if there is a capacity in the vendor to convey, so
soon as the conveyance is made there is a complete sale, and if
the corporation in purchasing violates or abuses the power to do
so, that is no concern of the vendor or his heirs. It is a matter
between the state and the city."
So this question can only arise in a direct proceeding by the
state against the Pacific Railroad Company, and not in a collateral proceeding like this.
The case of the_ Pacific Bailroad Co. v. Seeley's Heirs, 45
Missouri 212, was a suit in equity for the specific conveyance of
lands, and not an executed conveyance. That case went off on
the ground that the contract in question upon its face showed that
it was against public policy. The petition was demurred to and
the demurrer was sustained by the Circuit Court, and the judgment of the Circuit Court was properly affirmed by this court,
on the ground that the contract was void as being against public
policy.
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There is a manifest distinction between executory and executed
contracts; whilst a party may not be compelled by a court of
equity to carry a contract into specific execution, yet if he should
voluntarily make a deed, it will be good to pass all his title.
The case of The State v. Commissioners of M~ansfield, 3 Zabriskie's Rep. (N. J.) 510, so strongly relie on by the counsel for
appellants, is not in conflict with any of the doctrines here laid
down.
In that case the Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Company claimed that certain real estate, consisting of houses
and lots owned by that company and let by them to their workmen and employees, were exempt from taxation under a clause in
their charter exempting the "company from all further taxation."
The court held that this property was liable to taxation, whilst the
road-bed, turnouts, &c., were exempt, thereby holding that there
were two classes of real estate which the company had the power
to acquire and hold, the one being liable to taxation and the other
exempt. The same doctrine was maintained in Massachusetts in
the case of The Inhabitants of Worcester v. The Wilson Railroad
Corporation,4 Met. 564, which is looked upon as a well-considered
case. See also Whitehead v. Vinyard, decided at St. Louis by
this court, at the March Term 1872, not reported.
Under the view we take of this case, the judgment must be
affirmed.
The above decision will be read with
great interest by the people of the state
in which it was rendered. There has
been in Missouri a large amount of railroad town speculation. Counties have
subscribed liberally to the building of
railroads, with the understanding that
when constructed they were to pass
through and thus benefit certain towns
and cities therein ; and towns and cities
have subscribed expecting they were to
pass through their incorporated limits;
but not unfrequently the railroad companies would purchase, or take by gift,
lands adjoining or lying near to such
municipalities, and with the aid of their
railroad lay off and establish new towns
er additions-thus destroying the value

of the property of their benefactors to fill
their own treasuries.
But as a general thing such lands
were immediately laid off into town-lots
and sold to third parties, who entered
upon and improved them under their
titles from the railroad companies.
The companies in such instandes were
only authorized by their charters to hold
lands sufficient for their road-beds, depots, landing-places, &c.
In this condition of things the Supreme Court of Missouri, in the case
of the Pacificl. R. Co. v. Seeley et al.,
45 Mo. 312, Wvhich was a suit for specific
performance of a contract to lay off into
town-lots one hundred and sixty acres
of land, and to make a deed to an undi-
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vided fourth part thereof to the railroad
company, held that the company had no
power or capacity under its charter to
take or hold the property. The court
says: "The act of incorporation gave
the plaintiff the power to acquire a strip
of laud, not exceeding one hundred feet
wide, for a right of way, and to hold
sufficient ground for the erection and
maintenance of its depots, landingplaces or wharves, engine-houses, offices,
machine-shops, and wood and water stations; but it conferred upon it no authority to became a real estate broker or
speculator in town-lots. I think the
contract, so far as it proposed to invest
the company with the title to the lots,
was utterly void."
The general principles on which this
case was made to turn, as stated by
Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Dartmouth

College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518,
that "A corporation being the mere
creature of law, possesses only those
properties which the charter of its incorporation confers upon it, either expressly
or as incidental to its very existence," is
recognised by all the cases: .Beaty v.
Knowles, 4 Pet. 152.
When the decision in Pacific R. R.
Co. v. Seeley et al. was made, it was genutally thought that it would unsettle

the title to all property held by deeds
from the railroad companies throughout
the state, but the effect of the above decision is to render such tites perfectly
good, and by a process of reasoning
which we think is wholly unanswerable.
In Smith v. Sheeley, 12 Wall. 35,
the Supreme Court of the United States
decided that the capacity of a corporation
to take and hold real estate could not be
raised collaterally. The court says:
,"It is insisted, however, as an additional ground of objection to this deed, that
the bank was not a competent grantee to
receive title. It is not denied that the
bank was duly organized in pursuanc8

of the provisions of an act of the legis
lature of the territory of Nebraska, but
it is said it had no right to transact
business until the charter creating it was
approved by Congress. This is so, and
it could not legally exercise its powers
until this approval was obtained; but
this defect in its constitution cannot he
taken advantage of collaterally.
No
proposition is more thoroughly settled
than this, and it is unnecessary to refer
to authorities to support it. Conceding
the bank to be guilty of usurpatien, it
was still a body corporate de facto, exercising at least one of the franchises
which the legislature attempted to confer
upon it; and in such a case the party
who makes a sale of real estate to it is
not in a position to question its capacity
to take the title after it has paid the consideration for the purchase."
In the subsequent case of Myers v.
Croft, 13 Wall. 291, s. c. I1 American Law Register 308, the same court
says: "In relation to the first objection,
that the Sulphur Springs Land Company
was not a competent grantee to receive
the title it is sufficient to say, in tile absence of any proof whatever on the subject, that it will be presumed the land
company was capable, in law, to take a
conveyance of real estate.
Besides,
neither Fraily, who made the deed, nor
Myers, who claims under him, is in a
position to question the capacity of the
company to take the title after it has
naid to Fraily full value for the property."
The result of these decisions is, that
neither a grantor, or any one claiming
under him, can question the capacity of
the grantee to take and hold real estate,
and therefore a title coming through a
railroad or other corporation, is good.
without reference to the charter, as
against such vendor and his privies.
H. B. JomNsoN.
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Supreme Court of Michigan.
DWIGHT MAY,

ATTORNEY-GENERAL, ON RELATION OF COOK AND OTHERS V.

THE CITY OF DETROIT AND OTHERS.
The Attorney-General has the right to enjoin in equity an abuse of a corporate
franchise, as for instance, the payment of money by a municipal corporation on b
contract made in disregard of its charter.
But to warrant his interference the abuse must he one of a substantial nature, and
not one merely technical and unimportant. It should appear that the public has
a substantial interest in the question ; the right involved should be a public right,
or at least not a private right merely; the wrong done or attempted, if it consist
in a misuse or misappropriation of funds, should be either one involving questions
of public policy, or, when that is not the case, the amount involved should be
something more than merely nominal ; something it is not beneath the dignity of
the state to take notice of and protect by such a proceeding.
Where contracts for paving city streets are required by law to be let to the lowest
bidder, the purpose is to secure such competition as the nature of the case will
admit ; and something is Yiecessarily left to the discretion of the city council in
determining what course will best accomplish that end.
It is not illegal under such a law to call for proposals for the putting down of
the various kinds of wood and stone pavement, thus putting them in competition
with each other; and then when the proposals are in, select for putting down the
kind for which the most satisfactory bids, all things considered, are received.
But when the kind is thus selected the lowest bidder therefor has an absolute
right to a contract.
Where, however, the Common Council awarded the contract to the highest of
two bidders, but the difference in the bids was less than two hundred dollars, and
less than thirty dollars of this was to be paid by the city, the rest being a charge
upon lot-owners, and the contractors went on without objection and incurred large
expenses, and the lot-owners did not complain, Held, that the amount involved
was too insignificant to warrant the intervention of the Attorney-General, especially as there was no ground for charging the Common Council with intentional
wrong, and the error, if any, was one of judgment only.

APPEAL from Wayne Circuit. Opinion by
COOLEY, J.-The right of the Attorney-General to proceed in
equity to enjoin an abuse of corporate power consisting in the
appropriation of corporate funds in a manner not justified by law,
appears to me to rest on sound principles. The municipality and
its citizens are not alone concerned in such an abuse. The corporate powers have been conferred by the state, with such restrictions and limitations as were thought important, some of which
were imposed for the protection of the corporators against unjust
and oppressive action of officials and others from considerations
of general public policy. It can never be admitted that because
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the corporation and its members in general, or even all of then
consent to or connive at the setting aside of these restrictions an
limitations, the state, which deemed them important, shall not b
at liberty to complain, for this would !be to annihilate the just an,
necessary supremacy of the state, and to make the corporatorsole judges of what franchises they should exercise and wha,
powers the corporation should possess over them. It is the right
of the state at all times to keep the grantees of its franchisei
within the limits prescribed in the grant; and public policy in
general requires that serious departures shall not be overlooked.
even though the parties injured by the particular act do not complain; for one abuse becomes precedent for another, and the
Attorney-General does well to interfere when a municipality
assumes to do injurious acts which the state in conferring the
power to act at all, has expressly prohibited. It is conceded that
he has the right to enjoin the misappropriation of a charitable
fund held by the corporation; and had the fund in this case been
held by the city as a donation for the pavement of its streets under
the like conditions as to contracts to those prescribed by the
charter, his authority to file the bill would be clear. But as
between such a case and one where a fund has been raised by
taxation for a like purpose, I do not perceive any such distinction
as would create a difference in his right to intervene; and it
would seem to be equally clear when the state has allowed the
fund to be raised on certain conditions only, as where an individual has given a fund on the like conditions. Every misuse of
corporate authority is in a legal sense an abuse of trust, and the
state, as the visitor and supervisory authority and creator of the
trust, is exercising no impertinent vigilance when it inquires into
and seeks to check it. It must be conceded, I think, that this
doctrine is not very fully settled by authority in this country, but
this is perhaps because in very many cases individuals have been
allowed to file bills when the question involved was one rather
of public than of private concern; a practice which we are of
opinion has been carried to an unwarranted extent, and which is
musk restricted in this state by theldecision in Miller v. Grandy,
13 Mlich. 540. But in England the right of the Attorney-General
to file a bill in chancery in cases of this nature seems to be recognised; and without examining the cases in detail where the principle seems to me so plain, I refer to Attorney-Generalv. Brown,
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1 Swanst. 265; 1 Younge & Col. 416; 2 Mac. & Gor. 225; 11
Hare 205 ; L. R. 3 Eq. das. 552 ; L. R. 10 Eq. Cas. 152, as cases
which recognise more or less directly this doctrine. Nor can I
concur in the argument of the City Counsellor that to support the
suit, it must appear that the money involved is about to be appropriated to a purpose other than that for which it was raised. If
there was no right to make the contract on which the money is
proposed to be applied, it was an abusE of the corporate franchise
to raise it at all; but when it has been received in the city treasury ,ny application of it upon an unlawful contract is equally a
misappropriation, whether such an application had previously
been contemplated or not. It is the unwarranted use of the
money that justifies the interference, and the pretence upon which
it was raised is not important to the question of jurisdiction.
Where, however, the Attorney-General is to intervene in corporate affairs on behalf of the state the abuse should be one of a
substantial nature, and not of a character merely technical and
unimportant. It should appear that the public has a substantial
interest in the question; the right involved should be a public
right, or at least not a private right merely; the wrong done or
attempted, if it consist solely in a misuse or misappropriation of
funds, should be either one involving questions of public policy,
or, when that is not the case, the amount involved should be
something more than merely nominal; something that it is not
beneath the dignity of the state to take notice of or protect by
such proceeding. The remedy is somewhat extraordinary, and
substantial grounds ought to appear to justify a resort to it. It
becomes necessary, therefore, to consider whether any such substantial grounds support it in the present case.
The wrong complained of here is a disregard of the provisions
of the city charter, which require contracts to be publicly let to
the lowest responsible bidder. The facts appear to be that the
Common Council, having determined to cause St. Aubin avenue
to be paved, instead of determining in advance what particular
kind of pavement should be put down and confining their invitation for proposals to that kind, caused specifications for each
of several different kinds of wood and stone pavement to be prepared and filed with the Controller, and then. advertised that
sealed proposals would be received during a time specified for
paving said avenue with either wood or stone pavement, accord-
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ing to the specifications thus placed on file. It further appears
that in response to this advertisement ino fewer than fifty-seven
proposals were received from different parties for the putting down
of various kinds of wood and stone pavement, some of which were
covered by patents, and others were oplen to be put down by any
parties. The Detroit Ironizing and Paving Company submitted
a proposal for putting down the Ballard patent pavement, with
Medina curbstone, for $24;459.85, and ilsendegen & Dunn proposed to do the same for $24,642.46. These were the only bids
for that kind of pavement, but there were proposals for putting
down other pavements at much smaller isums.
Hillsendegen & Dunn were the assignees of the Ballard'patent,
but the Ironizing and Paving Company tendered to the city
ample indemnity against any liability to the owners of the patent
in case their proposal should be accepted. They were justified
by a previous resolution of the council in supposing that such
security would be regarded as sufficient. The council, however,
having determined to put down the Ballard pavement, rejected the
bid of the Ironizing and Paving Company on the ground that they
had no right to lay it and therefore were not responsible bidders
within the meaning of the law, and accepted the bid of Hillsendegen & Dunn, the assignees of the patent, whose right was supposed to be clear. It is a payment of money upon the contract
with these parties which it is proposed to enjoin in this suit.
The first question involved in the merits of the suit is whether
the council was justified in proceeding: in the manner mentioned
to obtain proposals. It is insisted, on behalf of the AttorneyGeneral, that the kind of pavement to be put down should first be
determined, and that bids should be called for and competition
invited for that kind alone. It is denied that wood pavement can
be put in competition with stone pavement, or that two kinds of
wood pavement essentially different in 'construction and cost, can
be included in the same notice, which calls only for proposals for
the paving of one street. The law, it is argned, intends that the
bids shall settle the right to a contract on a mere inspection of
the prices named; but if the bids are not to be all directed to the
same specifications they settle nothing, and it will always be in
the power of the council to reject the lowest bid on the pretence
that it is for an inferior pavement, -whether such" is the truth or
not, and to accept the bid of a party they desire to favor, on the
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claim that, though his bid is higher, yet it is for a better pavement, and consequently such bid is, all things considered, the
most for the interest of the city, and therefore to be deemed the
lowest.
It is not to be denied that there is a good deal of truth in this
argument; and if such a construction of the charter as the complainant contends for will put it out of the power of the council to
practise favoritism in awarding contracts, it ought to be sustained
as the one which the legislature must have intended. We are not
aware, however, that it has ever been supposed that the provisions
of the charter now in question would have that highly desirable
effect; on the contrary, it has often been observed that the most
severe and stringent regulations of this nature may be administered dishonestly, though according to the strict letter of the law,
so as not only to fail to give the proposed protection to the public, but, on the other hand, so as to operate as if purposely devised
to enable dishonest persons to plunder the public with impunity.
The requirement that contracts shall be let to the lowest bidder
is, in many cases, peculiarly susceptible of abuse. Its purpose is
to secure competition among contractors for public works and
supplies, and to give the public the benefit thereof. In some cases
the most ample competition would be invited by presenting to
bidders complete and particular specifications, which indicate
the precise things wanted or which are to be done, and leave
nothing to discretion or negotiation afterward. But this could
only be true where the case was such that many persons could
bid for the work or materials and would have a legal right to do
the one and furnish the other, andwhen the materials were not
monopolized in single hands, but were readily obtainable from
several sources. If a patented article was desired which wa
owned by a single person who refused to sell the right to territory
or to fix a royalty ; or if stone or any other material were required,
and a single person owned all within a practicable distance of the
place where it is to be used, nothing could be more obvious than
that proposals which confine bids to the particular article or material would invite no valuable compet tion, and that the protection of the public must lie in the power of the council to reject
unreasonable offers. In such a case nothing is easier than for the
council to obey strictly the letter of the law, and yet dishouestly
and corruptly award a contract to one who is lowest bidder for no
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other reason than because no one can bid against him, and who,
having a practical monopoly, is allowed to fix his own terms.
Now, if the purpose of the council is to secure competition in
work or supplies for the public, something is necessarily left to
the discretion of the council, and they must determine in each
case what competition the nature of the case will admit of, and
what is the best method to secure it. If they invite proposals for
a particular thing or process, they necessarily in so doing exclude
everything else which might have been substituted for the thing
called for; and there is no clearer field for corruption and favoritism than in shaping proposals if, in fact, the city is in corrupt
hands.
The matter of paving affords an apt illustration of this truth.
From the proposals before us it would be a reasonable inference
that there are several patented wood pavements nearly equal in
value and cost; but if the council call for proposals for one only,
they necessarily exclude all the others; and I am aware of no
legislation, and I can conceive of no process by which they can
be compelled always to make the selection from public motives
exclusively, if their disposition shall be to do otherwise.
It would be worse than idle for the law to mark out, or for the
council to follow, any one unvarying course in these cases. The
same course which, under some circumstances, would be manifestly
proper and most for the public good, under others would be so
plainly detrimental and place the public so completely at the
mercy of interested parties, that it could not be adopted by a body
having any liberty of choice without justly subjecting themselves
to the charge of corruption. It must therefore be manifest that
any inflexible rule which the law should lay down, and which
should trust nothing to the integrity and nothing to the discretion
of the council, must necessarily work mischief in many cases, and
it would be productive of good, I think, in few cases, if any.
I do not doubt that it was competent for the council in this
case to have confined the bids to what is called the Ballard pavement. But if this had been done it must be obvious that the best
method would not have been adopted to invite competition or to
obtain cheap pavements. Assuming that pavement to be protected by a valid patent, the assignees of the right were in position to fix their own terms in a contract or for the permission to
lay it. But if another kind was of nearly equal value, competi-
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tion might, perhaps, be had by putting the one against the other
and inviting bids for both. The greater the number of such pave.
ments the larger is the opening for competition. It is quite true
that if, when the bids are in, the council may reject one kind on
the ground of its being less valu4.ble than another, it must follow
that the bids are not conclusive upon the right to a contract; but
that a right in the council to determine the kind is more likely to
be exercised from dishonest motives after the bids are in than it
would be in deciding what bids should be received, is not, to my
mind, very apparent. On the contrary, the broader the door that
is opened to competition, the greater will be the number of those
who will be interested in watching the proceedings to see that just
awards are made and impartial. judgments pronounced. If there
is danger of corrupt understandings and combinations when there
are a score of bidders, the danger is proportionately increased
when the door is closed against all but one or two. And when,
as in this case, the owners of the patented process are not only
invited to bid against each other, but are also put in competition
with all who may offer to lay the kinds not patented, it is obvious
that the council in their invitation for bids have done all that the
nature of the case admitted of being done to secure competition
for the public benefit. The proposals have had the spirit of the
law in view, and I think are within the letter also.
If it is lawful to invite competition in this manner, it must also
be lawful in passing upon the bids to have regard to the relative
value of the kinds bid for, and the rejection of the kinds for which
the bid is lowest is therefore not necessarily erroneous. But the
rejection of the lowest bid for the particular kind fixed upon
raises other questions.
When bids are thus called for, all bidders for a particular kind
of pavement are bidders against all others, in a certain sense, but
are also bidders against each other in a more particular sense. It
would be the duty of the council, when all bids were in, to examine all, and to select the kind of pavement for which the bids,
all things considered, were relatively the lowest. They might
thus, perhaps, reject the kind they would have preferred in advance, but for which they find all bids exorbitant, and determine
upon another, because, in their opinion, the offers made for it are
more satisfactory. But when the kind is selected they have no
discretion to be exercised in a choice between responsible bidders.
The lowest his an absolute right to the contract.
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In this case there were two bidders for the Ballard pavement,
and the council awarded the contract to the highest. It is conceded that they did this on the sole ground that the lowest had
no right to lay it, and consequently could not be considered a
responsible bidder. Whatever security such a party might tender,
it is said could not be adequate, because if he had not the right
he might be enjoined in his attempt to put it down. And at best
the city would only take upon itself the risk of long and expensive litigation by accepting such a bid, with indemnity, which
might or might not after a time prove adequate.
Whether the council was justified in rejecting the lowest bid
under the circumstances and upon the ground stated, is a question I do not think we are called upon, by this record, to discuss,
and I shall express no opinion upon it. The company who were
lowest bidders took no steps to compel the city to enter into a
contract with them, but suffered the award to stand, and heavy
expenditures have been made in reliance upon it. They may,
therefore, fairly be held estopped from setting up any claim now,
and their appearance in this case as relators is of no importance.
The only considerations to be weighed are those of a public nature. There are no indications of a deliberate purpose on the
part of the council to disobey the law and misuse their franchise,
but if they have erred it has doubtless been through mistake in
judgment. All the interest which the public can have in the
matter must therefore be of a pecuniary character, and be measured by the difference between the two bids. The difference is
le's than 1-13th of 1 per cent. of the whole sum, and less than
one-sixth of this f.lls upon the city, the remainder being payable
by individual lot-owners. The lot-owners do not complain, and
when the amount thus becomes an individual charge the party
concerned may properly be allowed to waive legal objections and
make payment if he sees fit. The fund to be considered is therefore only that portion of the differe::ce between the bids which
would fall upon the city at large, and which* in this case would
constitute the measure of the public wrong. But that sum is
considerably below the sum named in the statute as the minimum of
equitable jurisdiction. And I see no reason for permitting the Attorney-General to invoke the process of equity on public grounds,
when the considerations are only pecuniary and involve less than
$30, while $100 is essential to give jurisdiction in private suits.
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The statute should apply by analogy, if it does not expressly.
The dignity, or the interest, or the public policy of the state is
not concerned to interfere for the correction of a mere error of
judgment on the part of corporate authorities, where the injury
is only pecuniary, and so far as it affects the public is so insignificant, and where the private parties who are chiefly concerned
have seen fit to waive their objections, if they had any.
The result is, that a case of equitable jurisdiction is not to my
mind presented, and the decree appealed from should be affirmed
with costs against the relators.
CHIISTIANCY, C. J., announced his concurrence in this opinion,
and COOLEY, J., stated that he was authorized by GRAVES, J., to

say that he also concurred.
CAMPBELL, J.-Whether the attorney-general can interfere in
such cases without some statute to determine the extent and conditions of such interference is a question on which I entertain
some doubts, and I express no opinion upon it. I think it very
clear that in this case he had no such right and no equity, and
upon this I concur with the general views of my brother COOLEY.
I think the method of competition adopted by the council here
was the best one which could be devised where patents are not
held open to the use of all persons upon a fixed royalty, and I
think they were fully justified in regarding no one as a responsible bidder who has no right to do the work, and could not do it
without danger of being enjoined by the patentee. The object
of the law is to secure that the work may be done without interruption, and not to invite litigation.
*I think, therefore, that the action of the council was not illegal, and cannot be complained of.

SuTpreme Court of Pennsylvania.
THE CHARTIERS AND ROBINSON TOWNSHIP TURNPIKE ROAt'

COMPANY v. BUDGE.
The Acts of Congress requiring certain instruments of writing to be stamped
before being used in evidence, apply to the use of such instruments in all courts,
both state and national.
Bythe Acts of Congress, an instrument of writing not properly stamped is pro.

bibited from being used as evidence, either in a state or a Federal court.

CHARTIERS, ETC., TURNPIKE CO. v. BUDGE.
Such prohibition, for the purpose of enforcing payment of the tax, is witbir
the power of Congress, though it indirectly affects the rules of evidence in state
courts.

ERROR to the District Court of Allegheny County.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
AGNEw, J.-It appears in the bill of exceptions in this case,
that the defendants offered in evidence 4 special written contract,
dated April 24th 1868, for the performance of the work done
by the plaintiff. Objection to its reception in evidence was made,
"because the paper is not stamped as required by the Act of Congress." The paper being not stamped, the court rejected the evidence. The single question is, whether the Act of Congress
justified the court in rejecting the paper as evidence. Under
this bill, no question arises upon the validity of the written contract. Had the paper gone in evidence, that point could have
been fairly open to discussion, under the 9th section of the Act
of Congress of July 13th 1866, amendatory of the 158th section
of the Act of June 30th 1864, declaring a paper not stamped,
"with intent to evade the provisions of the Act," "invalid and
of no effect :" Laws U. S., 1866, p. 303-4; Id. 1864, p. 148.
The inquiry under this bill is, therefor~e, confined to the amendment of the 163d section of the Act of 1864, contained in
9th section of the Act of 1866, p. 149, in these words: "That
hereafter no deed, instrument, document, writing or paper
required by law to be stamped, which has been signed or issued
without being duly stamped, or with a deficient stamp, nor any
copy thereof, shall be recorded or admitted, or used in evidence
in any court, until a legal stamp or stamps, denoting the amount
of the tax, shall have been affixed thereto as prescribed by law."
This provision gives rise to two questions; the first, upon the
meaning of the enactment; the second, upon the power of Congress to make it.
It has been held in Massachusetts and Michigan, that the provision applies only to the Federal and not to the state courts:
Carpenterv. Snelling, 97 Mass. 452; Lawrence v. H1aloway, 21
Mich. 162.
It seems to us this interpretation of the Act of Congress was
not well considered, and is contrary to the language and the design
nf the act The words are, "or used in evidence in any court."
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Language could not be broader, and no exception or qualification
is to be found in the act, while the design of Congress makes the
meaning perfectly clear. The paper is not to be admitted or used
in evidence "until a legal stamp or stamps, denoting the amount
of the tax, shall have been affixed thereto, as prescribed by law."
Thus the purpose is plain to prevent the use of the unstamped paper,
so long as it remains without pgyment of thetax or dutyupon it. This
is simply a disqualification of the instrument in the hands of the
delinquent, to prevent its use until he pays the tax. If "any
court" mean only the Federal courts, the design of Congress is
totally frustrated, as will be seen at once upon referring to
schedule B, containing the subjects of the stamp-tax, numbering
over forty classes of deeds, instruments, documents, writings and
papers used in ordinary business. They will be found to comprehend all those numerous writings of every kind which enter into
the domestic affairs of the people, and the business of everyday life, in the very-, bosom of the state-a few for example: agreements, chects, orders, bills, bonds, certificates, deeds,
mortgages, policies of insurance, leases, powers of attorney,
protests, receipts and legal documents. Now, for one such
paper which can be sued upon in the Federal court, by
reason of ex-territorial citizenship or other ground of Federal
jurisdiction, nine hundred and ninety-nine others can never reach
a Federal court, and must be prosecuted in the courts of the state
where they were made, and where the parties reside. This law
is a revenue law, and of what use is the disqualification of the
paper until the stamp duty is paid, as a means of enforcing payment, unless "any court" means state courts as well as Federal?
Other portions of the section confirm this interpretation. The
United. States have no offices for the recording of deeds, mortgages, powers of attorney and other documents, yet the paper is
forbidden to be recorded till the proper stamp tax be paid. The
word "recorded" cannot be separated from its immediate context:
the words following it, viz., "or admitted, or used in evidence in
any court," both run together, are part of the same sentence,
and interpret each other. If "recorded" applies, as'it must, to
state offices of record, "any court" applies with equal force to
state courts. Then, also, the words "1until a legal stamp or
stamps denoting the amount of tax shall have been affixed thereto,
prescribed by law," refer to all the different kinds and amounts
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of stamps in Schedule B, just as clearly as the words "deeds.
instruments, documents, writings and papers" refer to their various kinds in that schedule, and thus bring us back a second time
to the entire body of writings and papers in use among the people within the state. How can it be said, in view of all these
provisions, the subjects of the tax and the evident design of Congress, that the words " any court," thus used in the broadest form
and fullest sense, without qualification or exception, are to be
limited to the Federal courts, and thereby to defeat the enforcement of the payment of the tax, the only real purpose of the provision? When it is said, as in Carpenterv. Snelling, supra, that
Congress cannot pass laws regulating the competency of evidence
in the trial of causes in the several states, the purpose of this
provision is incorrectly stated. The abstract proposition is true.
but it is misapplied. The purpose of Congress was not to make
rules of evidence, but to stamp the instrument of evidence with a
disqualification which will prevent its use as evidence until the
delinquent has paid his tax. If, then, in 1bgislating upon proper
subjects of Federal power, so as to enforce the execution of the
rightful power of Congress, it be said Congress cannot affix to
the subject of the exercise of its clearly-granted powers qualities
which must be recognised by state courts, I deny the assertion.
and oppose to it the second section of the sixth article of the
Federal Constitution, which makes such a law the supreme law
of the land binding on the judges in every state. If, in legislating on a proper subject of Federal power, Congress declare a
forfeiture for instance of smuggled goods, with intent to evade
payment of the duties on them, the state courts are clearly bound
to recognise the title acquired by forfeiture in whosesoever hands
the goods may be. When the subject of a law is fairly within a
Federal power given in the Constitution, Congress has express
power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry the given
power inn execution. This is the test of the competency of this
evidence. The instrument being a proper subject of the Federal
power to tax, it is just as clearly competent for Congress to affix
a disability to the unstamped paper that will compel the payment
of the tax. The propriety as well as the necessity of the disability in this case is so obvious it does not admit of a serious
question. The writing is a thing done between private persons,
uanseen by the eyes of revenue officers. I4either party has a me-

CHARTIERS,

ETC.,

TURNPIKE CO. v. BUDGE.

tive to reveal it for taxation, for the tax enhances the price of an

article of sale, and the expense of every pecuniary transaction
evidenced by, a writing. Neither is interested in inflicting the
penalty upon the other. The very touchstone of"the value of the
writing to the party who claims under it, is his ability to put it in
evidence. It is just here the law touches the writing with its
power, and makes it useless to the party until he performs his
duty by paying the tax upon it. What can be more proper, and,
indeed, more just? He makes his contract under the law, and
subject to it. He knows, or is presumed to know his duty, and
should perform it. If he fail from real ignorance, or for reasons
which show that he did not intend to defraud the revenue, the
instrument is not invalid, and he has but to procure the writing
to be stamped, and can then use it in evidence. Then, on what
principles of reason or of sound constitutional law, can a state
court, subordinate in this respect by the Federal Constitution,
disregard the Act of Congress, and receive the disqualified paper
in evidence, when the prohibition concerns the rights of the superior government, and is essential to its power to collect the tax ?
The taxing power being a clear Federal grant of power, and the
disqualification affixed to the writing as an instrument of evidence,
being clearly proper to compel payment of the tax, the case falls
directly under that provision of the Federal Constitution which
makes the law supreme, "and the judges in every state shall be
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state
to the contrary notwithstanding."
We come next to the question of power, if, indeed, there can
be any question in a matter so plain. But courts in other states
have denied the power, and their decisions have been cited to us.
I shall, therefore, state our views briefly. I heartily concede the
doctrine of state rights in all those things wherein state rights
have been withheld from the Federal government, and are by the
Constitution itself reserved to the states, or the people thereof.
In all that concerns the personal happiness and freedom of the
citizen, the state is his natural protector, and I would cling to
her, therefore, in whatever belongs to her reserved and ungranted
powers. I have said, heretofore, that the doctrine of state rights,
pushed to excess, culminated in civil war, while the rebound,
caused by the success of the Federal arms, threatens a consolidation equally serious; and, therefore, that the landmarks of the
VOL. xxI.-1 I
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Constitution, as planted by Chief Justice IARSIIALL and his asro
ciates, on the solid ground of reason, and a due regard to thtrights of the states and of the Union, constitute the only safe
guides of decision: Craig v. Mline, 15 P. F. Smith 899. But
when, as here, a clear case of Federal power comes before us, the
paramount duty we owe, as state judges, to the Federal Constitution, requires that we should uphold the exercise of the Federal
powers, as a matter of duty and conscience.
The power of Congress " to lay and collect taxes, duties, im
posts, and excises," is the first great power conferred in the enumeration of powers found in the 8th section of the 1st article of
the Constitution of the United States, and immediately precedes,
as its true purpose and end, the power "to pay the debts and
provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United
States." The 19th clause in the same enumeration, declares that
Congress shall have power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into effect the foregoing powers, and
all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of
the United States, or any department or officer thereof."
At a very early day, Congress, under the taxing power, passed
a Stamp Tax Act, on the 6th of July 1797, entitled, "1_An Act
laying duties on stamped vellum, parchment and paper :" 1 U. S.
Stat. at Large, p. 527. The 13th section contains this clause"and no such deed, instrument or writing, shall be pleaded or
given in evidence in any court, or admitted in any court to be
available in law or equity, until it shal be stamped as aforesaid."
Next came the Act of 2d August 1813, entitled, "An Act laying
duties on notes of banks, bankers and certain companies; on notes,
bonds and obligations discounted by banks, bankers and certain
companies; and on bills of exchange of certain descriptions :"'
3 U. S. Stat. at Large, p. 77. The 7th section begins with this
provision: "1That no instrument or writing whatsoever, charged
by this act with the payment of a duty as aforesaid, shall be
pleaded, or given in evidence in any court, or admitted in any
court to be available in law or equity, unless the same shall be
stamped or marked as aforesaid." This section contained a further provision, enabling the party, in cases of omission, to pay
the stamp duty to the collector, and thereby to establish the efficacy of the instrument. Similar provisions are made in existing
lUwQ
Thus,. it anop.r- thnt+ . ....- e of the power in question,

CHARTIERS, ETC., TURNPIKE CO. v. BUDGE.

in its most rigid form, is an old practice of the government, sanctioned by those contemporary with the formation of the Constitution, and familiar with the relations between the states and the
Federal Government. Added to this, is the analogous legislation
exercised from the first year of the organization of the government. Thus the Act of July 31st 1789 to regulate the collection
of duties, in the 12th section, provides that goods, wares and
merchandise, landed without the collector's permit, shall be forfeited, and may be seized by the officers of the customs; and if
of the value of $400, the vessel, tackle and furniture shall be
subject to like forfeiture and seizure: 1 U. S. Stat. at Large, p. 29.
The Act of June 4th 1794, for the collection of the internal revenue upon distilled spirits, stills, wines and teas, in the 2d section,
provides for the forfeiture of the spirits distilled, and of the still
itself: 1 U. S. Stat. at Large, p. 379. Then there are the numerous statutes relating to the coasting trade, tonnage duties, the
embargo, &c., forfeiting both vessel and cargo; and various statutes on the subject of the internal revenue, forfeiting the subjects
of taxation for non-payment of the taxes and excises; and decisions thereupon without number. See Brightly's Federal Digest,
pp. 127-8, 278, 487, 736, 803. This power to forfeit the subject
of the tax, duty, impost or excise, as a consequence of evasion or
non-payment, is undeniable; for the reason that, being in the
exercise of the express powers of the Constitution, and the lawful
means of carrying these powers into effect, they are within the
clearly defined powers granted to the Federal Government. Now,
it is perfectly obvious, that the evidence of the title is not more
sacred than the very thing itself. If the latter can be forfeited
for delinquency, on what principle can it be affirmed that the
former cannot be reached to compel payment? Certainly, the
paper evidencing the owner's right to money or other property, is
quite as much within the power of regulation to secure payment,
as the thing itself is, of which it is the mere type. The argument
which affirms that it cannot be so regulated, places the incident
on higher ground than its principal, and makes the shadow more
sacred than the substance.
It is said, in some of the cited cases, that the dxercise of this
power enters within the domain of the state, and interferes with
its internal affairs. Granted; but what logical consequence follows ? Certainly not that the Act of Congress is unconstitutional
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and invalid. From the very nature of the power to lay taxes
and excises, its exercise comes right into the heart of the state,
and visits its citizens in all their most private relations, estates
and property. It is more searching in its operation than the
power to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy, to return
fugitives from justice and labor, to calliout the militia, to regulate
the value of money, and fix a standard of weights and measures,
and to establish post-offices and post-roIads; yet all these, admittedly, enter within the state, and touch most intimately its business and people. Like the taxing power, these are among the
express powers of Congress, and their rightful exercise within
the states is, therefore, undoubted. A notable instance of the
exercise of Federal power within the bosom of the state is that
discussed in United States v. Tisher, 2 Cranch 358, under the
Act of Congress giving priority in payment to the claims of the
United States out of the estates of decedents. Chief Justice
MARSHALL there discussed and settled the interpretation of the
nineteenth clause of the eighth section of the first article, conferring the power to pass necessary and proper laws to carry the
main powers into effect. In that case, from the duty of the United
States to pay their debts, is inferred the power of preserving their
own claims as a means of paying debts; and from this was inferred the further power of declaring the claims of the United
States first liens on the estates of decedents, thereby entering into
the most sacred trusts of the state herself, in which she holds the
property of the dead, and changing the order of distribution of
that property placed upon it by state legislation. This right of
priority of the United States has been conferred upon the sureties
of debtors by way of subrogation.
Without extending the argument unnecessarily, the License
Tax Cases, 5 Wallace 462, bear more directly upon the question
of power in this case, and, in effect, settle it. It seems to us
very clear, that the provision of the Act of 1866, which excludes an unstamped writing or paper from record, and as evidence
in any court until the tax be paid, is not a rule for the mere
regulation of evidence, but is a disqualification attached to the
document, making it incompetent to fulfil its purpose as an instrument of evidence until the stamp-duty is paid; that it is a provivision to enforce the payment of the: tax of the most necessary
kind, and binding on all courts; and that it falls clearly within
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the express powers of Congress to levy taxes, duties, imposts and
exciscs, and to make all laws necessary and proper to carry the
taxing power into execution.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
THomPsoN, C. J., and SHARSWOOD, J., dissented.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
THE STATE v. CARROLL.
It is not necessary in all cases, in order that the acts of one acting as an officer
without legal right, may he holden valid as to the public and third persons, as the
acts of an officer defacto, that he should have color of election or appointment by
the only body which has power to elect or appoint him, or that the appointing or
electing body should in all cases possess the legal power.
The expression used in the opinion of the court inDouglasv. Wickwire, 19 Conn.
492, that "it is enough if the officer acts under color of an election or appointment
by the only body which has power to make it, ' if intended as a general definition,
is inaccurate, and the definition given in Plymouth v. Painter,that an officer de
facto is one who exercises the duties of an office under color of appointment or
election to that office, is not sufficiently comprehensive.
From a general review of the English and American authorities upon the point,
it appears that a definition, in order to be sufficiently comprehensive and accurate as a general one, must be substantially as follows : An officer de facto is one
whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy
and justice, will hold valid, so far as they involve the interests of the public and
third persons,, where the duties of the office were exercised, 1. Without a known
appointment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence
as were calculated to induce people without inquiry to submit to or invoke his
action, supposing him to be the officer he assumed to be. 2. Under color of a
known and valid appointment or election, but where the officer has failed to conform to some precedent requirement or condition, as to take an oath, give a bond,
or the like. 3. Under color of a known election or appointment, void, because
the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing
or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise,
such ineligibility, want of power, or defect, being unknown to the public. 4. Under color of an election or appointment by or pursuant to a public, unconstitutional
law, before the same is adjudged to be such.
The acts of an officer appointed by and acting under and pursuant to an unconstitutional law, performed before the unconstitutionality of the law has been judicially determined, are valid, as respects the public and third ibersons, as the acts
of an officer defacto.
Where the Constitution prescribed that the judges of the Supreme, Superior
and inferior courts should be elected by the General Assembly, and a judge of a
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city court was so elected, and it was further provided by law that in case of his
sickness or absence a justice of the peace should be called in by the clerk t,, hold
the court as acting judge during such temporary sickness or absence, and a justice
of the peace was so called in and acted, it was holden that whether the law
was constitutional or not, and whether the call had been recorded according to
law or not, he was an officer de facto, if not de JFure, and judgments rendered by
him were valid.
COMPLAINT for a libel and breach of the pence, brought to the City
Court of the city of New Haven. The court found the prisoner guilty,
and he appealed to the Superior Court.
The caption of the record of the judgment of the City Court was as
follows: "At a City Court held at the city of New Haven, this 24th
day of August, A. D. 1871, present, Hon.1 IVr. IV. MORSE, justice of
the peace, acting judge, holding said court." In the Superior Court
the following amendment to the copy of the record of the City Court
was filed and allowed
"The judge of the City Court of New Haven, H. LYNDE HARRISON
being absent, and he not having requested in writing any justice of th.peace residing in said town of New Haven to act in his place, and i"
the absence of the judge of the City Court of the city of New Haven,
and of a justice acting as judge of said court by request and appoint.
ment of the judge, in writing; therefore !the cletk of said City Court
of New Haven, Julius Twiss, Esq., did request, in writing, WILLIA,
W. MORsE, a justice of the peace residing in said town of New Haven.
to act in the place of the judge of said City Court, which request wa
as follows, to wit:"New Haven, August 15th 1871.
"Win. W. 31orse, Esq.,
"You are hereby requested to appear and act as judge of the Police
Court of the city of New Haven, at 9 o'clock A. ml., August 16th 1871.
in consequence of the absence and disability of Judge HARRISON, and
also to act as said judge until Judge HARRISON shall resume his place,
JULIUs TwIss,
or until further notice.

"Verk

of the City Court of ReNo Haven.

"And thereupon the said WILLIAM W.-MORSE, a justice of the peace
for New Haven, residing in the town of New Haven, did act in the absence of the judge of the said court, in the place of the judge of said
court, August 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, and 26, 1871.
'- The above and foregoing is a true copy of record.
JuLius Twiss,
"Attest:

" Clerk of said C'ty Court of New Haven."
The prisoner moved to erase the case from the docket of the Superior
Court, for the following reasons -First, because the court before which be was tried was an irregular
and pretended court, not. holden by H. ILYNDEF HARRISON, Esq., the
only judge of said court, but by one WILLIAM W. MoRsE, who was
never elected judge of the same by the General Assembly.
Second, because said court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and if by
any means said 'MoRsE could have authority to hold said court, it would
be indispensable to show upon record how he acquired such authority,
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and particularly that he was a justice of the peace for New Haven
county, residing in the town of New Haven, and that said Judge HARRISON was in some way disabled from trying said cause or holding said
court; and that said MORSE had been duly requested in writing to act
as judge; and that said request had been duly recorded; and that the
disability of said Judge HARRISON had not been removed before the
trial of said cause.
The Superior Court found the following facts, and thereupon reserved
the case for the advice of this court.
The record of the City Court, of which a copy was allowed by this
court to be filed on the seventh day of the present term by way of amendment of the copy previously sent up by the clerk, was first completed
by the clerk ofethe City Court on the 12th day of September 1871, after
the filing of the present motion to erase. Said clerk had the following
minutes written by himself, and no other, to guide him in completing
said record; first, the following entry made by him, contemporaneously
with the occurrences therein noted, in the docket-book of the City Court:
"New Haven, August 16th 1871, WILLIAM W. MORSE, Esq., acting
judge in consequence of the sickness of Judge HARRISON, by written
request from the clerk of said court, Julius Twiss, clerk, acted as judge,
August 16th, 17th and 18th, also August 21st, 22d, 23d, 24th, 25th
and 26th." Second, the original letter recited in the amended copy
of record, which was preserve4 by the clerk in said book as a part
of the minutes from which to complete the record in said case, that
being the ordinary course, but not at that time attached thereto, or to
anything else. Said letter was never copied at length anywhere on the
records of said City Court, until the completion of the record on the
12th of September. Third, the ordinary entries on the file and on the
docket-book itself, containing the names of the parties, the date of trial,
nature of complaint, judgment rendered thereon, and notes of future
proceedings
H. Stoddard, for the State.
. E. Baldwin, for the prisoner.
BUTLER , C. J.-We do not assent to the claim made on behalf of the
state, that Mr. MORSE, when he rendered the judgment in question,
was acting as a justice of the peace with enlarged powers. He was not
called in, within the intention of the law, to hold a justice's court in the
City Court room, but to hold the Cty Court as constituted by law, and
as an actingjudge of it, and he did hold that court, and that only. The
judgment appealed from is the judgment of the City Court, or a nullity.
Nor do we assent to the other proposition of the attorney for the state,
tha. the motion came too late. If, as is here claimed to be true, a want
of jurisdiction appears upon the record, the case may be dismissed by
the court on motion of either party, or its own motion, at any stage of
the proceedings. In State v. Smith, cited and relied upon, the want of
jurisdiction did not so appear. The question of jurisdiction raised by
'the motion must therefore be met.
The defendant claims that the law is unconstitutional, and further
claims tbaL the court was not legally, if constitutionally, organized,
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)ecause the letter of the clerk calling in Mr. MORSE was not recorded
at length, before he assumed the duties of acting judge. Waiving for
the present the consideration of the first claim, I am inclined to think
that the minutes which were made in the docket-book lireparatery to a
full record (which we all know and the court have found was in accordance with the "general practice in our courts), were a sufficient record
within the spirit and purpose of the law, for they were in the place and
of the character which persons inquiring would expect, and were a substantial compliance with its letter. It is not said in terms by the act
that the request must be fidfy recorded, and it is only by construction
or implication that we can arrive at the conclusion that it should have
been done. That implication may be properly controlled by the custom
of our courts to consider such entries as substantially records, to be amplified thereafter. But it is unnecessary to give: and I do not give, a
positive opinion on that point for myself or the court; for the defect, if
it be one, is a defect of qualification in the officer, by reason of an omission of his, or of the clerk, and is not of a character to prevent his acts
from being valid as the acts of an officer de facto, whether the law under
which he was called in was constitutional or not. This will clearly
appear hereafter.
If the principle on which Brown v. O' Connell, 36 Com. 432 was decided, viz., that an officer who exercises the duties of an office under and
pursuant to the provisions of an unconstitutional law is as to the public and
third persons an officer de facto, be sound i Mr. M oRsE was such officer,
and the judgment is valid. The principle was questioned in the argument
of that case, and in the dissenting opinion, mainly on two grounds, viz.,
First, on the ground that there must be, in order to constitute an officer
de facto, color of election or appointment by the only body which had
power to elect or appoint; and second, on the ground that a law manifestly unconstitutional has not even the semblance of authority, and
cannot confer any color whatever.
A third point was made in the. dissenting opinion, to the effect that
the court was not constitutionally organized, but if anything more was
intended by that point than that the court was not constitutionally
organized because Judge IERRILL was not elected by the General Asseuibly, it does not deserve consideration. The constitutional power of
the legislature to establish that or any other inferior court was not questioned in the argument of that case, and is unquestionable; and the idea
that the want of a provision for the election of the judge by the legislature, or the provision for his election by the common council, rendered
the whole act void, is untenable. A law nay be good in part, and bad
in part, and now that the General Assembly elect the judge, no onfj
supposes that the provisions of the act, which established the court
should have been re-enacted, or are not valid; or that there was or is
any defect, in that respect, in the law.
But the first two grounds of objection made in that case do deserve
consideration, and in justice to the court and the profession I deem it
my duty to give them a thorough examination, and to show that beyond
all question, Judge MERRILL in that case, and Mr. MoRsE in this, were
judges de facto, and their judgments valid.
First, then, as to the point that in order to constitute an officer de
facto there must be color of appointment or election by the only body
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hich had the power to appoint or elect. No authority was cited for it
xcept an expression used by Judge HiN.isAN in Douglass v. Wickwire,
19 Conn. 492, and quoted in State v. Brennai's .iquors, 25 Conn. 283.
The claim was that the expression was used as a definition of that which
constitutes an officer de facto. The expression was this: "1I is enough
if the officer acts under color of an election or appointment, by the only
body which has the power to make it." With reference to this I
observe:
1. That the expression was an entire sentence in the original, and
was not used as a definition. It does not in itself import a general rule.
It may mean, and was apparently intended to mean, simply that it was
enough in theparticularcase that the facts were so, and those of us who
knew the late Chief Justice well, and his uniform habit of confining himself to the principles necessary for the decision of the case, know that
nothing more was intended by him. If the words are susceptible of a
broader meaning when read in connection with the context, it can only
be, "that it is enough in any case, &c." They cannot, without violating every rule of construction, be extended so as to mean, as claimed,
that it is necessary in. all cases that color of appointment or election must
be given by the only body who had power to make it. The facts in the
ease of State v. Brennan'sLiquors were substantially similar, and it is
obvious that Judge WAITE quoted the expression of Judge HIN35TAN,
not as a comprehensive definition, but as applicable to that case also.
Moreover, both Judge HINMAN and Judge WAITE were members of the
court when the elaborate opinion of Judge STORRS in Plynwuth v. Painter,
17 Com. 589 was given three years before, and concurred in it. In that
opinion Judge STORRS said: "The rights of no person claiming a title or
interest under or through the proceedings of officers having apparent authority to act would be safe, if he were obliged to examine the legality of
the title of such officer up to its original source." That was sound doctrine, universally recognised. But if it be true, as claimed, that the
body making the election or appointment must possess competent power,
a fact which cannot always be expected to appear, it is necessary that
the person dealing with an officer having color of an election or appointment, shall inquire into the competency of the electing or appointing
body, or act at his peril. A definition leading to such a result could not
have been intended.
2. But if it were admitted that such a definition was intended, it
would be entitled to no respect. -"one such is to be found anywhere,
with or without the qualification "yprimdfacie," in any of the more than
two hundred cases which have been decided in England and this country, in respect to this matter. Such a definition is directly in conflict
with the principles which underlie the de facto doctrine, -and to a strong
and irresistible current of decision in England and this country, commencing with the earliest case in the Year Books, and extending to the
present time.
The first case to be found in the Year Books was that of The Abb
of Fountaine,which was tried in 1431. The action was debt on a bond
given by one F., as the abbot of the convent of Fountaine, for supplies
furnished the convent. The action was brought against one R., as his
successor. The defendant pleaded that the abbots of the order were
elective; that before the making of the bond, the abbacy being vacant,
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an election was held, at which R. had twenty-four votes, and F. but
ight; that F. procured himself to be instituted and inducted by the
-isiting ordinary, took possession of the coivent, held the same wrong"ully as against R., and while so holding wrongfully, executed the bond.
Ind further, that he was thereafter displaced, and R., the duly elected
ibbot, duly inducted into office. The plaintiff claimed that the plea
was not a proper plea in bar, in form or substance, and declined to answer it. The question heard, therefore, was whether the plea was in
form and substance a good plea in bar, There was a long and interestin- discussion, rather than argument, between the four justices and
chief justice and the counsel engaged in the case. Cases were put and
analogies drawn from various sources in the law, and various opinions
were expressed with more or less certainty by the judges, but no definite
conclusion was arrived at, nor is it certainly known that any decision
was ever made. The general impression in the courts has been that the
bond was held good, and the fact is so stated by Judge STorts in P7/mouth v. Pauinter. But there is no clear evidence of the fict on record.
The case is principally valuable on account of the opinions expressed
by the different judges, and which were not dissented from. Among
these I find the following by BABINGTON, Chief Justice: "In every
case, if a man be made abbot or parson erroneously, and then is removed
for precontract, orfor any like matter, yet a deed made by him and the
convent, or by the parson and the patron and the ordinary, is good ; as
if an abbacy or church be vacant, and a man who had no right pretended
to be patron, and preferred one A., by force' whereof he is installed, and
then he is ousted by legal process inasmuch as thepatron had no right;
yet a deed which was made before is good. But if abbey or church be
legally full, and the patron prefer one who is instituted by the ordinary,
without deposing the other by due process, and then the other makes a
re-entry and oust the other, in this case a deed made by him who was
put in possession wrongfully is void, because there was always another
parson, so that the second was only an usurper."
That statement of the law by the chief justice was not questioned by
the other judges or the counsel. His object in making it evidently was
to bring the attention of counsel to the question on which, in his opinion, the case hinged, viz., whether the election of I. by twenty-four
votes made him so presently abbot de jurp that the office was legally
full, so that F. could not be considered, for that technical reason, an
abbot defacto, by reason of his installation .and possession, as soine of
the judges were inclined to consider him. The statement is undoubtedly sufficient evidence that it was not then necessary, to constitute an
officer de facto, that the person who made the appointment should have
authority to make it, but that, if made by a pretender, and the officer
was qualified, took possession of the office and acted, he would be a de
facto officer in respect to the public and tlhird persons.
In 1461, on the accession of Edward IV., Parliament declared tht.
previous Henrys of Lancaster usurpers; but, to avoid great public mischie, also declared them kings defhcto, and persons were punished in
that reign for treason to Henry VI., not in aid of the lawful claimant.
of the Crown: I Bl. Comm. 204.
The next case chronologically was that of Knowles v. Luce, in the
same century, Moore 109. In that case two stewards were authorized
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to hold a manorial court jointly, and one held it alone, and took a surrender, and it was held that .the surrender was good, for although he
could not alone receive the surrender de jure, yet he had sufficient color
to constitute him an officer defaeto. In that case it was said by MANWOOD, J., in giving his opinion, that an officer continuing to exercise an
office after his time had expired was a good officer de facto, and that
where the clerk of the lord of the manor held a manorial court without
general or especial authority from the lord to do so, he was a good officer
de facto until disturbed by the lord; for the tenants were not obliged to
examine into his authority, nor was he compellable to give an account
of itto them.
In the case of O'Brian v. Knivan, decided in 1520, Oro. Jac. 552,
a new bishop, instituted and put in possession before the old one had
been legally removed, was holden a good bishop de facto as to third
persons.
In Lord Dacres' Case, decided in 1553, the servant of the steward
held a manorial court without any authority, and he was holden a good
officer de facto, and his acts valid as to third persons: 1 Leonard 288.
In Leak v. Howell, decided in 1596, reported Cro. Eliz. 533, the
deputy of a deputy was holden a good officer de facto, although the
deputy had no authority whatever to appoint.
In Harrisv. Jays, decided in 1599, reportel Cro. Eliz. 699, a steward
for one of the manors of the county, who could only be appointed by
the lord, was appointed by the auditor and surveyor of the county, without any authority whatever, and acted as such, and it was held that he
was steward de facto, although he could not grant a copyhold which had
eseheated, because it was in prejudice to the queen ; but that other ac;s
done by him were good.
The case of Kight v. The Corporation of Wells, decided in 1688, reported Luttwych 508., was a case where one was legally elected who was
disqualified, and he was holden an officer de facto.
The important case of Parker v. Kett was decided in 1693, and reported 1 Raymond 658, and 12 Iodern 467. In that case the authorities were reviewed by Lord HOLT, and it was again holden that the
deputy of a deputy, although his appointment was wholly witbou,
authority of law (inasmuch as a delegated authority could not be delegated), derived sufficient color from it to constitute him an officer de
facto. Lord HOLT, in that case, on such review, cited the cases from
MANWOOD'S opinion in Knowles v. Luce, and the reasoning, approvingly,
and gave the definition which has since been adopted and prevailed in
the English law, viz. : "A steward de facto is no other than he who has
the reputation of being such steward, and yet is not a good steward in
point of law."
The next case was that of Rez v. Lisle, which was decided in 1738.
This case deserves careful consideration. There is a brief, inaccurate
and deceptive report of it in Strange 1090, but a very full report in
Andrews 163. The case was quo warranto against Lisle at the suit of
the king, as a pretended burgess in the town of Christ Church. Lisle
was nominated by an acting mayor, Goldwire, and elected burgess, but
it was claimed that Goldwire was not mayor, either dejure or defacto, and
had no right to nominate. It appeared that he never was in fact elected,
but pretended to be so, was sworn in, and acted as such. It also appeared
that a giuo warranto was pending against him at the time of election, and
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that the facts were all known to Lisle.

Several questions were made, of

which two only are material. The first was whether Goldwire was mayor
dfacto. the second was whether, if he was such, the nomination and
election of Lisle were good.
Upon the first question, "it was held by the whole court, except LEE.
C. J., who gave no opinion as to this point, that Goldwire was not so
much as a mayor (lefacto. For, in order to constitute a mayor deflcto.
it is necessary that there be some form or color of an election ; but without this the taking the title and regalia of the office, and the actinir and
being sworn in as mayor, are not sufficient. And with this agrees The
Abbot of Fountaine's Case. Now here it appears that Goldwire was
never elected in fact; and although it be stated that he was sworn at
the lect. it does not appear (as it ought) thait this was agreeable to the
constitution of the borough. And it is not material that he acted as
mayor, as it is found that a quo warranto was recently prosecuted against
him, pending which the present election was made, and that lie waE
thereupon adjudged to be an usurper. The consequence hereof plainly
is that the election is void." And LEE, 0. J., said, " in these cases the
proper question is whether the person be an officer de facto as to the
particular purpose under consideration, according to 1 Salk. 96."
Upon the second poing the court said: "By the whole court: Supposing that Goldwire wa
mayor de facto, yet the acts here found to
be performed by him are not good, because they were not necessary to
the preservation of the corporation. In these cases the proper distinction is between such acts -s are necessary for the good of the body,
which comprehend judicial and ministerial acts, and such as are arbitrary and voluntary. The election of the defendant is of the latter kind.
For as the number of burgesses is indefinite, it doth not appear, nor is
it stated, as it should have been, that the choice of a burgess was
necessary."
The court in continuing their opinion distinguish that case from all
others, using the following la,'guage : This case therefore differs from
those which have been cited for the defendant, for in those either the
act was such as the officer was obliged, or compellable to do, as in Palmer 479, or such in which a strangerwas conzcerned, and had a 9-ight to
or paid a consideration for." That case related solely to the internal
working of a corporation, and the prior cases to which I have alluded
were not considered as applicable.
The material part of the report in Strange is as follows:
And upon
this state of the case the court were all of opinion that Goldwire must
be taken to have been a mere usurper, and that, in order to constitute a
man an officer de factoi there must be at least the form of an election,
though that, upon legal objections, may afterwards fall to the -round."
"The other point was left undetermined, as not being necessary to
deliver any opinion upon, as it was not pretended that the presiding of
a mere usurper would do, and the court had determined that Goldwire
was no more. But they strongly inclined that the presence of a mayor
de facto, recently prosecuted, and against w~mm judgment of ouster had
been obtained, would not be sufficient to authenticate the defendant's
election. The court gave judgment for the king."
Upon comparing this report of Strange sand I have copied all there
is of it after the.statement of facts), with the extracts I have given from
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the full report of the opinion of the court, it will be seen that the report
of Strange is inaccurate and deceptive in three particulars. The first
is the statement, as a general proposition, that in order to constitute a
man an officer de facto there must be at least the form of an election.
The court said no such thing. They were dealing with a case which
concerned the corporation only, and they said that in order to constitute
a mayor defacto there must be some form or color of an election. The
proposition contained in Strange is a general one, embracing all officers,
and opposed to all the cases before reported. The proposition of the
court was confined to the particular case, involving the status of an officer
of a corporation in respect to the proceedings of the corporation, and
had no reference to the public or third persons. M1oreover, it appears
in Andrews, that the court distinguished the case from cases in which
strangers were concerned-an important fact, in respect to which the
report in Strange is silent.
The second misrepresentation of Strange is that the court all agreed
in that proposition. But the fact appears that LEE, 0. J., gave no
direct opinion upon the point, but on the contrary said, "in these cases
the proper question is whether a person be an officer de facto as to the
particulrr purpose under consideration," thus limiting the opinion to
the particular case. And that distinction is sustained by an irresistible
current of authority.
The third misrepresentation is that the second point was left undetermined, whereas it was fully determined by the whole court, and it was
distinctly held that, even if mayor de facto, the election was void, on
the ground that the act concerned the corporation only, and was not a
necessary one.
I have been thus particular about that case, because it was misreported by Strange, and related to the internal affairs of a corporation
only, and not to the public or third persons, and is not, as his report
makes it, in opposition to the whole current of English decisions before
and since, but outside of that current, and because the courts of this
country have been misled by his report into the adoption of erroneous
definitions and conceptions of the subject. The case, however, as will
be seen, even as reported by Strange, does not support the idea that
there must always be competent or primOfacie power in the appointing
or electing body, and, so far as I can discover, as reported by Strange,
has never been cited or approved by any English court, for any purpose
The next case was that of Rex v. Bedford Level, decided in 1805,
and reported 6 East 356. The question in that case was whether a
deputy recording officer, who continued to act after the death of his*
principal, was an officer de facto. The case was carefully considered,
and Lord ELLENBOROUGH, giving the opinion of the court, disregardIng Rex v. Lisle, and citing from Knowles v. Luce and Parkerv. Kett,
approvingly, adopted the definition of Lord HoLT as a general one, and
and said, "an officer de facto is one who has the reputation of being
the officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of'
law." The court held the acts of the deputy registrar to be good until
the death of the principal was known, but not afterward.
There is the later case of .MargatePier v. Hannam, 3 B. & Ald. 266,
decided in 1833, where a justice was holden an officer de facto, though
not properly qualified, and some stifl later cases of disqualification, but
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none which involved the competency of the appointing power, or which
contain a definition.
Upon this review of all the material English authorities running
through four centuries, it will be seen that: the idea that color can only
be conferred by a body or person having power, or prim facie power,
to elect or appoint in the particular ease, has never been broached in
England, but that on the contrary it has been holden, first, that a parson
presented by an usurpiny patron who was wholly without authority to
present, was a good parson (16 facto. Second, that a clerk of a lord of
the manor holding a manorial court without any authority whatever, and
deriving color only from his known relation to the lord of the manor as
a simple clerk, was a good officer de facto. Third, so of the servant of
a steward, holding a manorial court without any authority from the
steward or the lord. Fourth, so of the deputy of a deputy, to whom
authority could not be delegated. Fifth, so of the steward of a manor,
appointed, not by the lord who alone had power to appoint, but by county
officers who had no authority whatever to appoint. Sixth, a re-affirmance
of the doctrine that the deputy of a deputy, has sufficient color to make
him a de facto officer, by Lord HOLT, on a!full review of all the cases,
ii Parkerv. Kett, and the following broad and comprehensive definition
given, viz. : "A steward de facto is none other than he who has the
reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, although he is not such
in point of law." Seventh, the adoption of Lord HOLT's definition by
Lord ELLENBOROUGH and a full court of Wing's Bench, as late
1805,
Andasfinally,
on careful consideration, and as applicable to all officers.
the fact that the definition has never been questioned since in England,
and is now the rule there.
Nor has the idea ever been suggested in this country in any of the
more than one hundred and fifty cases which have been decided here.
so far as I can discover. On the other hand, the authorities which are
inconsistent with it are quite numerous. Such are the cases of Fowle-r
v. Bebee, 9 Mass. 231, where the governor appointed an officer some
months before the law creating the office and authorizing the appoint,meat took effect. That case has been a leading one in this country, and
has been recognised as authority in at least fifty other cases.
Such also is Parkerv. Baker, 8 Paige 428, where the governor appointed an officer without authority to appoint, and the vice-chancellor
held his acts void, and the chancellor reversed the decision, holding him
to be an officer de facto. So in Nevada, where justices of the peace
were elective by the county, and, no election being held. the selectmen
without authority appointed a justice for the town, and the governor
commissioned him, and'his acts were holden good as those of an officer
,iefacto : Hallett v. Uncle Sam Co., 1 Nevada-188. Such also were
the following cases: Taylor v. Skrine, 2 Brevard 516; The People v.
hifte. 24 Wend. 520; The People v. Kane, 23 Id. 414; Carlton v.
T/w People, 10 Mich. 250; Cocke v. Halse.y, 16 Pet. 71 ; Commonwealth
v. McCombs, 56 Penn. St. R. 436; Clark v. Commonwealth, 29 Id. 129
This review would be imperfect, if I did not add that the definition.
irrespective of the idea that there must be competent authority in the
appointing or electing body, and as heretofore used in this court, is not
sufficiently comprehensive or accurate. I am aware that it is a prevalent
'me in thiL country, but its introduction may be traced to the inaccurate
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and deceptive report of Rex v. Lisle, in Strange. It was so introduced
into our law by Judge Hos.=ER, in fcCallv. Byram Manufacturing Co.,
6 Conn. 428, and has been retained because there has been no occasion
for a particular examination of the subject. It was introduced into the
state of New York in a somewhat singular manner. Counsel in the case
of The People v. Collins, reported 7 Johns. 549, claimed it as a definition, and in connection with it, that the acts of such an officer were
valid as to the public and third persons. Chief Justice KENT expressed
his assent tW the proposition as settled law. In the opinion given in the
case, however, he enlarged upon the validity of the acts of an officer de
facto; but said nothing about the definition. At that time the definition was unknown to the law, and it is very evident that the assent of
the Chief Justice, from the terms of it, had relation to the validity of
the acts of such an officer, and not to the definition. In MfInstrey v.
Tanner, 9 Johns. 135, the reporter in a note cited the proposition of
counsel in People v. Collins, and gave his readers to understand that
the Chief Justice assented to the whole proposition. The definition
was subsequently adopted in their courts, but they found it necessary
to qualify it afterwards. Thus introduced, it has been adopted by the
courts of other states, but several of them have also found it necessary
to qualify it, as we shall see.
In respect to this subject, as to many others to which the principles
of law are to be applied, concise general definitions are difficult, and
discrimination is necessary.
The defacto doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter of policy
and necessity, to protect the interests of the public and individuals,
where those interests were involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an office, without being lawful officers. It was seen,
as was said in Knowles v. Luce, that the public could not reasonably be
compelled to inquire into the title of an officer, nor be compelled to show
a title, and these became settled principles in the law. But to protect
those who dealt with such officers when apparent incumbents of offices
under such apparent circumstances of reputation or color as would lead
men to suppose they were legal officers, the law validated their acts as
to the public and third persons, on the ground that, as to them, although
not officers de jure, they were officers in fact, whose acts public policy
required should be considered valid. It was not because of any quality
or character conferred upon the officer, or attached to him by reason of
any defective election or appointment, but a name or character given to
his acts by the law, for the purpose of validating them. When, there:
fore, in civil cases the public or third persons had knowledge that the
officer was not an officer de jure, the reason for validating the acts to
which they submitted, or which they invoked, failed, and the law no
longer protected them. That principle was recognised and applied even
in Rex v. Lisle, and particularly in Rex v. Bedford Level.
It should be remembered that among the earliest cases there was a
distinct class entirely independent of color derived from any known appointment or election, where the law said to the public as a ruie of
policy: "If you find a man executing the duties of an office, under
such circumstances of continuance, reputation, or otherwise, as reasonably authorize the presumption that he is the officer he assumes to be,
you may submit to or employ him without taking the trouble to inquire
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into his title, and the law will hold his acts valid as to you, by holding
him to be, so far forth, an officer de facto. If he has color of appointment or election, and yet is not a good officer for the want of authority
in the appointing power, or irregularity in exercising it, or because there
was another lawful officer entitled to the office, or because the incumbent was ineligible, or had not qualified as the law required, or his term
had expired, your case is made stronger by the color, but that kind of
color is not essential to your protection, for you are not bound to inquire
to see that it exists."
So the law has spoken in England from the first
introduction of the doctrine, as the cases abundantly show. So it speaks
there now. So it spoke in this country until that deceptive definition
was introduced from Strange, and so it has since spoken, and the definition been modified accordingly, whenever a case has arisen where the
policy on which the law was founded has made it necessary that it
should so speak, to save the public from mischief, or individuals from
loss.
Thus, in 1830, in the case of Wilcox v. Smith, reported 5 Wend. 231,
the question arose as to the validity of an execution issued by one who
was reputed to be a justice of the peace, and had acted as such for three
years preceding the trial. For the first year of that time the town in
which he resided was a part of the county of Genesee, for the last two
it was a part of the county of Orleans. It was shown that he had not
been appointed by the officers of the county of Orleans, nor did it appear that he had ever been appointed by the officers of the county of
Genesee. All that was shown was that lie took the oath and acted as a
justice, while the town was a part of the county of Genesee. There
being no color by election or appointment shown, the Court of Common
Pleas charged the jury that the process issued by him was void, as they
aropverl should have done ifthe definition fron,
Y
trange wus law. The
case went to the Supreme Court, and they had before them the question
whether the acts of an officer involving the interests of third persons,
where no color of election or appointment was shown, could be val4datcd
or not-a question which tested the truth of the definition. The court
held that they could be, and put it upon the ground that, without color
of election or appointment, he should, under the circumstances, be presumed to be an officer defacto, and say, "the mere claim to be a public
officer, and the performance of a single or even a number of acts in that
character, would not perhaps constitute a man an officer defacto. There
must be some color of an election or appointment, or an exercise of the
affice, and an acquiescence on the part of the public, for a length of time
which would afford a strong presumption of at least a colorable election
or appointment."
Another case, which in like manner tested the accuracy of the definition, arose in North Carolina in 1844, and may be found in 4 Iredeli
368. The question there was whether a deed of trust was duly approved
before the clerk, and recorded by the register of Gates county. It appeared that one John Walton was duly elected register in 1829 for the
term of four years, that being a statutory term, and there being no provision authorizing him to hold over. It further appeared that, without
any new appointment or a legal right to continue in the office, he did
continue to exercise the duties of register until 1843, and until after lie
recorded the deed in question. It was claimed that all his acts after
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the expiration of his official term under the original appointment were
wholly void, and therefore that the deed had not been duly registered,
and that no estate had passed. The court did not attempt to hold that
the original appointment gave any color to Walton during his occupancy
of the subsequent terms, but held, upon broad, general principles, that
his acts must be validated to prevent private losses and general mischief,
which the reporter embodied in the following syllabus: "The acts of
officers de facto, acting openly and notoriously in the exercise of the office
for a considerable length of time, when they concern the rights of third
persons or the public, are valid as if they were the acts of rightful officers." The court refer to a prior case in the same volume-that of
Burke v. Elliott-in which they say, that there must at least be some
colorable election and induction into office ab origine. or so long an exercise of the office, and acquiescence therein by the public authorities, as
to afford the individual citizen a presumption strong that the party was
duly appointed, and therefore that every person might compel him, for
the legal fees, to do his business, and for the same reason was bound to
submit to his authority as the officer for the county. "A public office,"
they say, "is to be supposed necessary for the public service, and for the
convenience of all the various members of the community; and therefore that it will be duly filled by the public authority. When one is
found actually in office, and openly and notoriously exercising its functions in a limited district, so that it must be known to those whose official duty it is to see that the office is legally filled, and also that it is not
illegally usurped; and when this goes on for a great length of time, or for
a period which covers much of the time for which the office may be lawfully conferred, it would be entrapping the citizen and betraying his
interests, if when he had applied to the officer de facto to do his business, and got it done as he supposed by the only person who could do it,
he could yet be told that all that was done was void, because the public
had not duly appointed that person to the office which the public allowed
him to exercise." There again it was found that the definition was not
sufficiently broad and comprehensive.
A similar case arose in Maine, in 1854: Brown v. Lunt, 37 Maine 322.
A justice of the peace, an annual officer, without any legal right to hold
over, who had been justice for many years in succession, was not reappointed, but continued to act, and took the acknowledgment of an
important deed. The question was raised whether the act was valid
and the deed good. The deed was executed about two years after his
term of office expired, and the court held the acknowledgment good.
In an elaborate and learned opinion they say, that an officer de facto is
one who has the reputation of being an officer (citing from Parker v.
Kett and Rex v. Bedford Level), or one who actually performs the duties
of an office with apparent right, and under claim and color of an appoint.
ment or election, or one who exercises the duties of an office with at least a
fair cole, of right, or an acquiescence by the public in his official acts, so
long that he may be presumed to act as an officer by right of an appointment or election. The casewas sustained on all these groundA. It was a case
where there was sufficient reputation, and sufficient ground for presuniption, but in my judgment not a case of color. It seems to me absurd to
say that color from election or appointment can extend beyond the distint and independent term for which the officer was elected or appointVOL.
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ed-beyond the term when the election or appointment could be
operative, if legal.
These cases seem to me sufficient to show that even our definition of a
de facto officer, as introduced by Judge JiOSMER from Strange, is imperect, and tends to obscure the true character of the doctrine. They
are all cases of usurpation, without election or appointment for the terms
during which the acts were done, or color from that source, and sustainable only on the ground of reputation and presumption.
Doubtless color of election or appointment froin competent authority
is necessary for the protection of an officer defacto, when he is assailed
directly because of his acts. And there :are other distinctions which
bear upon the relation of an officer, as that he cannot collect his fees, or
claim any rights incident to his office, without showing himself to be an
officer de fitre, but which do not bear upon the case in hand. I will
not pursue that branch of the subject any further than to say, that we
shall see hereafter that an officer will be protected in relation to all acts
done under or pursuant to public law, before it is judicially determined
to be unconstitutional.
A definition sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to cover the whole
ground must, I think, be substantially as follows: An officer de facto
is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon
principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve
the interests of the public and third persons, where the duties of the
office were exercised,
First, without a known appointment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce
people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing
him to be the officer he assumed to be.
Second, under color of a known and valid appointment or election,
but where the officer had failed to conform to some precedent requirement or condition, as to take an oath, give a bond, or the like.
Third, under color of a known election or appointment, void because
the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the
electing or appointing body, or by reason 'of some defect or irregularity
in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public.
Fourth, under color of an election or appointment by or pursuant to a
public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.
Anything less comprehensive and discriminating will, I think, be
imperfect and deceptive as a definition.
We come now to the second and more important proposition advanced
in Brown v. O' Connell, to the effect that I"a law passed by the legislature cannot have color of authority, or the semblance of authority, unless
it appears primO face to be law, and that it cannot so appear if it is
manifestly repugnant to the Constitution ; that a law of doubtful constitutionality may be presumed to be constitutional until it is judicially
decided to be otherwise, but that a law manifestly unconstitutional is
void upon its face, and unable to confer the appearance or color of
authority." The inference to be drawn from these assumptions necessarily is, that a manifestly unconstitutional law is without any force
whatever, and that whether manifestly unconstitutional or not, and
whether to have the appearance and force of law or not, are questions
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for the private judgment of the citizen. If these assumptions were true
they would dispose of this case, but they are of novel impression, and
fundamentally erroneous. Every law of the legislature, however repugnant to the Constitution, has not only the appearance and semblance of
authority, but the force of law. It cannot be questioned at the bar of
private judgment, and if thought unconstitutional resisted, but must be
received and obeyed, as to all intents and purposes law, until questioned
in and set aside by the courts. This principle is essential to the very
existence of order in society. It has never been questioned by any
jurist to my knowledge. It was never questioned even by Mr. Calhoun
and his disciples that an unconstitutional law of Congress, manifestly
and palpably unconstitutional, had the color and semblance of authority,
and was obligatory upon the citizens of a state, as citizens of the United
States, until it was nullified by an act of the state legislature, which they
claimed might be done on the ground that the General Government was
the creature of a compact between the states, and its laws might therefore be so nullified by action of the state legislatures. Certainly they never
asserted that a legislative enactment of a state, having all the forms of
law, had not the force of law to all intents and purposes as against the
citizen of the state, however repugnant to the state Constitution, until
set aside by the courts.
The doctrine that a law of doubtful constitutionality may be presumea
to be constitutional until judicially decided otherwise, and that a law
manifestly unconstitutional cannot be so presumed, has no existence as
applicable to the citizen. There is a rule of judicial construction adopted
by the courts, to the effect that unless the law is clearly unconstitutional,
or if it is of doubtful constitutionality, they will not declare it unconstitutional. But that is a rule of purely judicialconstruction, and can have
no other application. That rule has been repeatedly recognised in this
court. Thus in .artford Bride Co. v. Uion,Fery Co., 29 Conn. 210,
Judge ELLSWOnTa says: "It is however a well settled principle of
judicial construction, that before an act of the legislature ought to be
declared unconstitutional, its repugnance to the provisions or necessary
implications of the constitution should be manifest, and free from all
reasonable doubt. If its character in this regard be questionable, then
comity and a proper respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government
should determine the matter in favor of the action of the latter." It
has never been claimed to my knowledge before, that the citizen may
adopt that judidial rule of construction, and treat a law, if manifestly
unconstitutional, as without the semblance or color of authority. It is
an instance of the misapplication of an unquestioned rule.
If then the law of the legislature, which creates an office and provides
an officer to perform its duties, must have the force of law until set aside
as unconstitutional by the courts, it would be absurd to say that an officer
so provided had no color of authority. But on this question we need
not reason. There is an irresistible current of authority in this country
which determines it.
As early as 1815 the question arose and was settled in South Carolina.
The constitution of that state provided that the judges of the Superior
Court should be elected by the legislature in joint ballot. The legislature subsequently passed a law authorizing the governor to appoint a
jidge to hold the court temporarily during'the sickness of the judges.
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That law was holden unconstitutional. The question subsequently arose
in the case of Tylor v. S'kr2ine, 3 Brevard 516, whether a judge
appointed by the governor under the law, and who held a term pursuant
to appointment, was a judge de fiacto, and it was holden that he was,
and his judgments valid. The reasoning of the court was sound and
forcible, but I have not space for it.
Tile question subsequently arose in the Circuit Court of the United
States in Mississippi, and was carried to and determined by the. Supreme
Court of the United States, in Cockc v. .alsey, 16 1eters 71. By the
constitution of that state judges and clerks of probate were made elective
by the people. The legislature provided by law, that in case of the
disability of a clerk the court of probate might appoint one. An elected
and qualified clerk of one of the courts of probate left the state for an
indefinite period, and the judge appointed another to serve during his
absence, and the question was whether he was a de jure clerk, and if not,
whether he was such defacto ; it being claimed that the law authorizing
his appointment was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held him, as
to the public and third persons, admitting the unconstitutionality of the
law, a clerk de facto.
The constitution of the state of New York provides that "1the governor
shall nominate by a message in writing, and with the consent of the
senate shall appoint, all judicial officers except justices of the peace."
In manifest disregard of that plain provision, the legislature passed a law
authorizing the common council of the city of Albany to establish a
police court, and appoint a police judge. After a time the constitutionality of the law in respect to the judge was questioned, and the judge
was removed by a quo warrantoto the Supreme Court. No question was
of course made on the quo warranto in relation to the validity of the acts
of the judge, but, in the subsequent case of Tie Peoplev. White, 24 Wend.
520, the court, in reviewing the cases in relation to defacto officers, said:
"Still more recently we have pronounced judgment of ouster against
the police judge of the city of Albany: The People v. Kane, 23 Wend.
414. But those who executed his mandates, while he held under the
forms of law, are as perfectly protected as though there had been no
defect in his title, and his orders and judgments are as valid and effectual as though he were an officer de jure." T'hat case was" ad idem"
with Browu v. O'ConnelU
Another case of substantially the same character, The People v. White,
already alluded to, is reported 24 Wend. 520. There the legislature,
by a special law, made the aldermen of the city of New York ex officio
judges of the oyer and terminer. A prisoner was convicted of murder
before that court, two of the aldermen sitting with the other judges.
Objection was made by the prisoner to the organization of the court, on
the ground that the law authorizing the aldermen to sit was manifestly
unconstitutional. But the Supreme Court held that the aldermen were
nevertheless judges de facto. The case was carried to the Court of
Errors, and in that court there was no dissent in relation to that point
of the case, except by the chancellor, and four of the seven members of
thn court, who gave opinions expressly concurred on that point with the
Supreme Court, the two others expressing no opinion upon it. Senator
Verplanck, the strongest man perhaps among them, covered the whole
ground by the following paragraph: "Thus, in respect to the judicial
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character of the aldermen, I agree with the Supreme Court that the
aldermen, whether constitutionally or not, are judges of the Oyer and
Terminer-are so de facto-their commissions being written in the
Btatute-book, which is to be presumed valid and constitutional throughout until it is otherwise decided as to any provision. I agree therefore
that their acts as judges cannot be impeached subsequently, collaterally,
or by private suit, or criminal proceedings against them as individuals,
under any view of their constitutional rights." Nothing was ever more
clearly, comprehensively or truthfully expressed. The case was reversed
on other grounds.
The same question arose in the state of Michigan, in the case of
Carlton v. The People, 10 Mich. 250. By a provision of the constitution of that state, the laws of the legislature were to take effect and
become operative ninety days from the passage thereof. The legislature,
on the 4th of February, passed an act creating a new county, and authorized the election of county officers in April ensuing. The officers were
elected in April within the ninety days, and before the law coula constitutionally take effect, and they subsequently acted as such. The
validity of their acts was questioned, on the ground that the law was
unconstitutional and inoperative, inasmuch as it could not authorize an
election within the ninety days. A majority of their Supreme Court
held that, however that might be, the officers had color of title from the
law, and their acts were valid as those of officers de facto.
The same question arose in the state of Pennsylvania, in Clark v.
Commonwealth, 29 Penna. St. R. 129. The constitution of that state
provided that the state should be divided into judicial districts, and that
the presiding judge of the county court in each district should be elected
by the people thereof. The legislature by law transferred a county from
one judicial district to another, during the term for which the judge of
the district had been elected, and the then presiding judge of the dis.
triet to which the county was by law so transferred held court in that
county, and a prisoner was convicted before it of murder. It was
objected on behalf of the prisoner, that the act of the legislature was
equivalent to the appointment of a judge for that county, and therefore
unconstitutional. The case was carried to the court of last resort, and
it was there held that, admitting the law to be unconstitutional, the
judge who acted under and pursuant to it was a judge defacto, and the
prisoner could not be heard to deny it.
In another and very recent case in that state, Commonwealth v. iCombs,56 Penna. 436, the question whether an unconstitutional Act of
Assembly was sufficient to give color of title, and constitute an officer
appointed by and acting under it an officer de facto, again came up, and
was again determined in the affirmative. Judge STRONG, now of the
Supreme Court of the United States, gave the opinion of the court, and
said: " When he who is exercising the duties of an office is acting under
the apparent authority of an Act of Assembly, his title to the office is
not to he assailed collaterally. This I understand to have been again
and again decided. An Act of Assembly, even if it be unconstitutional,
is sufficient to give color of title, and an officer acting under it is an
officer deficto." This case was decided as late as 1867, and states the
proposition as one which has been frequently decided.
These seven cases are all that I can find which bear directly upon the
point. There is a large class of cases where the appointees were ineli-
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gible under the Constitution, yet held offices de facto, some of which
were appointed by the legislature, and their appointments holden void,
but they are not so direcr.ly in point as those I have cited. Those seven
cases, all decided since 1814, are all in point, are all one way, and unopposed by any conflicting decision. They were all cases of maniest
repugnancy, and they form a body of authority resting on fundamental
principles quite sufficient to sustain the decision of the court in Brown
v. O' Connell, and that must control this part of the case.
The question whether the act under whic h the justice held the city
court was constitutional or not, we do not think proper, under the circumstances, to decide. As he was clearly a judge de facto, a decision
of the question is not necessary, and it has not been, and should not be,
the practice of this court to decide upon the !constitutionality of an Act
of the General Assembly unnecessarily, nor without full and exhaustive
argument. Such argument we have not heard in this case-the question being scarcely alluded to on behalf of the state. Moreover, there
is a colemporaneous exposition and practice' in relation to the subject
peculiar to this state, and other existing laws, which render the question
one of grave importance.
The Constitution provides specifically for two courts-a Supreme and
a Superior Court-and for the election of judges for each. Yet in the
first judiciary act which was passed under the Constitution, and with
the concurrence of many of the men who framed it, the judges of the
Supreme Court were made ex offci'o judges of the Superior Court, and
that provision remained in force unquestioned from 1821 until the courts
were re-organized in 1855. Prior to 1855, no judges of the Superior
Court were elected distinctively as such, and those courts were held by
the Supreme Court judges, ex ofrWf'o, and by their own allotment.
In like manner in the first judiciary act succeeding the adoption of the
Constitution, the county courts were authorized to be holden in part by justices of the peace, when two of the judges were disqualified, and entirely
by justices when all of the judges were disqualified. So the law in relation
to the County Court stood so long as that court was organized with three
judges, and until 1838. After the number iof judges of that court was
reduced to one, and county commissioners appointed to perform its local
duties, in 1839, a law was passed providing that the place of the judge
should be supplied, when necessary, by the county commissioners, with
such justices of the peace as they-should select. In case a commissioner
was disqualified to sit, the judge of the court was authorized to select a
justice of the peace to preside in his place. If the judge and all the
commissioners were disqualified, it was provided that the court should
be holden by three justices of the peace selected by the sheriff. The
County Court was reorganized in 1841 by the appointment of three
judges for the entire state, and the provisibn that the county commissioners should hold a court, when the judge assigned to hold it should
be disqualified, was retained.
So, laws providing that the duties of the judge of probate, when the
office was vacant, or the judge disqualified, ishould be performed by the
judge of an adjoining district, and laws authorizing him to call in
originally justices of the peace, and since a judge of the county or superior courts, to aid in the trial of disputable cases, have in some form existed since 1716. And now we have a law also authorizing this court to
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ie filled up, in case of vacancy or disability, by calling in judges of the
3uperior Court, and many cases have been decided by this court, when
o constituted in part within the last three years, which would be reverible on error, if the law is unconstitutional. A decision which may
overturn a system of laws by which all our courts, including this, are
filled up in cases of emergency, should not be lightly made.
Looking, then, to the general practice which existed in relation to the
manner of filling the courts in cases of vacancy or disability, from ap
early period in the history of the state, and to the contemporaneous and
continued adoption of the practice under the Constitution ; to the fact
that a decision of the question may reach all the courts of the state, and
that it has not been fully argued; and the fact that the decision of the
question is unnecessary in the case, for that the justice must be holden
to have been a judge de facto, and his judgment will be valid in any
event, we deem it our duty to leave the question undecided.
The foregoing opinion will require no
commendation at our hands. It will
speak for itself wherever it comes. We
cannot forbear to say, that such exhaustive examination and careful analysis
of the cases upon any important legal
question, by a learned and experienced
judge, is of incalculable value in keeping the cases within the proper sphere
of the rules of law. They are the landmarks of the law, like chronometers, so
to speak, by which we are enabled to
Keep the divergent estimates of the law,
as of time, to the true line. It is not uncommon for case after case to follow in
argument the errors and misapprehensions of their predecessors; until we
have a long line of decisions, substantially right in principle, but resting upon
false reasons growing out of defective
generalizations or imperfect definitions ;
so that when any new case arising outside of the current arguments and definitions, upon which the former cases are
made to rest, but still within the general
principle involved; when it becomes a
serious difficulty to know whether the
former cases shall be treated as authority
for the general principle which they involve, or only for its operation within
the limits of the former definitions and
illustrations, there exists no clear and
certain guide. And it is only, in the
familiar language of the late Chief Jus-

tice SHAw, by following the track back,
and finding where we switched off, that
we are enabled to place all the cases
upon the true line. This has been done
in the most satisfactory manner by the
learned Chief Justice BUTLER, in the
foregoing opinion. The profession, we
are sure, will feel grateful to him for
having spent so much careful labor in
evolving the true principle upon which all
the cases upon this important subject rest.
We need not refer to the cases, since
they are sufficiently discussed in the
opinion. The result of them all seem,
to be, that an officer de facto is jus
what the term implies-one who b.
right, but without having complied witl
all the formal requisites and qualifications, or else by mistake and misapprehension, or perhaps by downright
wrong and gross usurpation, is, for the
time, exercising the functions of the
office, and whom, from necessity, all
persons having to do with such functions must employ, and to whose acts
all must submit, since he holds the
insignia of the office and the powei
to enforce obedience to his demands.
The rule of law by which the public arc
excused from looking into the title of
the officer whom it may be compelled tc
employ or to submit to, is one of stric,
necessity, in order to preserve peace an.
maintain order, since any other rule
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would lead to so much uncertainty, and
such constant conflicts, as to break up
the order and quiet of all civil administration. The same rule is of necessity
applied to all official acts under defacto
governments, after the order of administration becomes settled, although by rebellion or usurpation, as was done in
Sadler v. Gayle, 22 La. Ann. 155, in regard to the acts of a sheriff in one of the
seceded states. And hence we may justly
apply the same rule of legalizing the
acts of an officer de facto, to one who
obtains the office by force or fraud, as if
he had come into it through the most
unquestionable right and justice, but not
with all the formalities required by the
law. And these extremes will cover
auy number and variety of intermediate
eases. The only inquiry which third
persons are bound to make is, to know
if the person they employ is really exercising the functions of the office, and
has obtained from the proper source the
insignia of the office. Thus, in Wayne
Co. v. Benoit. 20 Mich. 176, it was
held, that one who has obtained office
and been invested with the legal indicia
of title is, until ousted, a legal officer,
so as to render his official acts as valid
as if his title were not disputed. And
the rightful officer, who is kept out of
office by any means, has no legal claim
for the salary: Smith v. New York City,
37 N. Y. 518.
Hence we mayjustlyrepeat our former
.,efinition, that the very term "officer
,ie
facto" takes no account of the mode
by which the result is reached, and requires nothing more than that he should,
in some way, be placed in the office and
should have obtained a quiet holding,
so as really to be peaceably in possession
and actually exercising the functions of
the office. We take no account here
of cases where the office is in actual conflict, two or more persons claiming to
exercise its functions at the same time,
and each denying the authority of the

other. In such case it may be thai
neither is entitled to do valid acts, or pos.
sibly some other rule may have to be
applied in such cases when they occur,
which, to the credit of our people, have
hitherto been too rare to attract much
attention, But the general rule, as we
have stated it, is sufficiently vindicated
by the able opinion in the principal
case.
Nor can we perceive that the fact that
the most approved writers and judges
have adopted forms of language, in
speakiug of officers de facto, less comprehensive than the definitions here contended for, tends, in any degree, to
weaken its authority. It is the more
common mode of defining points in the
law, inci dentally to refer to the moie
usual incidents and facts under whith
the point may arise. Thus the learned
commentator on American law, 2
Comm. 295, in speaking of officers
de facto, uses this language: "In the
case of public officers, who are such
de facto, acting under color of office by
an election or appointment not strictly
legal, orwithout having qualified themselves by the requisite tests, or by holding over' after the period prescribed for
a new appointment," &c. By a strict
application of the maxim Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, we might here
reach the conclusion, that officers de
facto could only exist under color of an
election or appointment, or by holding
over after the term of the office expired.
But when we refer to the cases cited by
the learned author, we find that he uses
these definitions only as illustrations,
or instances, wherever the principle has
been held applicable. And if we look
further, and reflect upon the principle
of the rule, that the acts of an officer
de facto shall be held valid, as to the
parties connected with the transactions,
without regard to the officer's rightful
title, we must conclude that whenever a
case. arises where one is wrongfully exer-

